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Abstract. We consider k-Facility Location games, where n strategic agents report their locations on the
real line, and a mechanism maps them to k facilities. Each agent seeks to minimize his connection cost,
given by a nonnegative increasing function of his distance to the nearest facility. Departing from previous
work, that mostly considers the identity cost function, we are interested in mechanisms without payments
that are (group) strategyproof for any given cost function, and achieve a good approximation ratio for the
social cost and/or the maximum cost of the agents.
We present a randomized mechanism, called EQUAL COST, which is group strategyproof and achieves a
bounded approximation ratio for all k and n, for any given concave cost function. The approximation ratio
is at most 2 for MAX COST and at most n for SOCIAL COST. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
mechanism with a bounded approximation ratio for instances with k ≥ 3 facilities and any number of agents.
Our result implies an interesting separation between deterministic mechanisms, whose approximation ratio
for MAX COST jumps from 2 to unbounded when k increases from 2 to 3, and randomized mechanisms,
whose approximation ratio remains at most 2 for all k. On the negative side, we exclude the possibility
of a mechanism with the properties of EQUAL COST for strictly convex cost functions. We also present
a randomized mechanism, called PICK THE LOSER, which applies to instances with k facilities and only
n = k + 1 agents. For any given concave cost function, PICK THE LOSER is strongly group strategyproof
and achieves an approximation ratio of 2 for SOCIAL COST.
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1 Introduction
We consider k-Facility Location games, where k facilities are placed on the real line based on the
preferences of n strategic agents. Such problems are motivated by natural scenarios in Social Choice,
where the government plans to build a fixed number of public facilities in an area (see e.g., [12]). The
choice of the locations is based on the preferences of local people, or agents. Each agent reports his
ideal location, and the government applies a (deterministic or randomized) mechanism that maps the
agents’ preferences to k facility locations.
The agents evaluate the outcome of the mechanism according to their connection cost, given by
a nonnegative increasing function c(d) of the distance d of their ideal location to the nearest facility.
Agents seek to minimize their connection cost, and may misreport their ideal locations in an attempt of
manipulating the mechanism. Therefore, the mechanism should be strategyproof, i.e., should ensure
that no agent can benefit from misreporting his location, or even group strategyproof, i.e., should
ensure that for any coalition of agents misreporting their locations, at least one of them does not
benefit. The government’s goal is to minimize an objective function of the agents’ connection cost.
Most prominent among them are the objective of SOCIAL COST, which considers the total cost of
the agents, and the objective of MAX COST, which considers the maximum cost of an agent. So, in
addition to (group) strategyproofness, the mechanism should either optimize or achieve a reasonable
approximation to the designated objective function, thus ensuring that the outcome is socially efficient.
Previous Work. The numerous applications and the elegance of the model have attracted a signifi-
cant volume of research on the problem. In Social Choice, the emphasis has been on characterizing
the class of (group) strategyproof mechanisms for locating a single facility if the agents’ preferences
are single-peaked. Roughly speaking, an agent has single-peaked preferences if he has an ideal loca-
tion (or peak), and consistently prefers less the locations farther from it. However, the strength of his
preference for locations closer to his peak is not explicitly quantified by any function of the distance.
For general single-peaked preferences, a classical result of Moulin [13] shows that the class of deter-
ministic strategyproof mechanisms for locating a single facility on the line coincides with the class
of generalized median mechanisms (see also the surveys of Barbera´ [2] and Sprumont [18], and [14,
Chapter 10]). Schummer and Vohra [17] extended this characterization to tree metrics, and proved
that for non-tree metrics, any onto strategyproof mechanism must be a dictatorship. More recently,
Dokow et al. [3] obtained similar characterizations for locating a single facility on the discrete line
and on the discrete circle.
Adopting an optimization viewpoint to Facility Location games, Procaccia and Tennenholtz [16]
introduced the framework of approximate mechanism design without money. The basic idea is to
consider game-theoretic versions of optimization problems, such as k-Facility Location, where effi-
ciency is quantified by an objective function (instead of efficiency related properties, such as onto,
non-dictatorship, and Pareto-efficiency, typically studied in Social Choice). Then, any reasonable ap-
proximation to the optimal solution can be regarded as a socially desirable outcome, and one seeks
to determine the best approximation ratio achievable by strategyproof mechanisms. As for the prefer-
ences of the agents, with respect to which strategyproofness is defined, this line of research adopted
the standard definition of Facility Location problems from Operations Research (see e.g., [11]). Thus,
it implicitly abandoned the setting of general single-peaked preferences, in favor of the more restricted
(and technically easier to handle) case where the agents’ cost is given by a linear function c(d) = αd
of their distance d to the nearest facility. Translated into this framework, the results of [13,17] imply
a deterministic strategyproof mechanism that minimizes the SOCIAL COST for 1-Facility Location
on the line and in tree metrics. On the negative side, the impossibility result of [17] implies that the
best approximation ratio achievable for the objective of SOCIAL COST by deterministic strategyproof
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MAX COST
k = 1 k = 2 2 < k < n− 1 k = n− 1
Deterministic 2 [16] 2 [16] ∞ [6] ∞ [6]
Randomized 1.5 [16] [1.5, 5/3] [16] [1.5, 2] [here] 1.5 [4]
SOCIAL COST
k = 1 k = 2 2 < k < n− 1 k = n− 1
Deterministic 1 [13] n− 2 [6], [16] ∞ [6] ∞ [6]
Randomized 1 [13] [1.045, 4] [10], [9] [1.045,n] [here] [1.045, 2] [here]
Fig. 1. Summary of known results on the approximability of k-Facility Location on the line (with linear cost functions) for
the objectives of MAX COST and SOCIAL COST. In each cell, we have either the precise approximation ratio (if known)
or the interval determined by the best known lower and upper bounds. In cells with two references, the first is for the
lower bound and the second for the upper bound. We note that the lower bound on the approximation ratio of deterministic
mechanisms for k ≥ 3 is only shown for anonymous mechanisms. The randomized upper bounds proven in this work are
shown in bold and hold for any concave cost function.
mechanisms for 1-Facility Location in general metrics is n − 1. However, the explicit quantification
of agents’ preferences now allows for randomized mechanisms that are strategyproof with respect to
the agents’ expected cost (a.k.a. incentive compatible in expectation, see e.g., [14, Section 9.5.6]) and
may achieve better approximation ratios.
Since [16], there has been a considerable interest in quantifying the best approximation ratio
achievable by strategyproof mechanisms for k-Facility Location on the line and in general metric
spaces. As a result, the approximability of k-Facility Location (with linear cost functions) by deter-
ministic and randomized strategyproof mechanisms has become well understood in many interesting
cases (see also Fig. 1). The main message is that deterministic strategyproof mechanisms can only
achieve a bounded approximation ratio if we have at most 2 facilities [16,6]. On the other hand, ran-
domized mechanisms achieve better approximation ratios for 2-Facility Location, and also a bounded
approximation ratio if we have k ≥ 2 facilities and only n = k+1 agents [4]. Notably, such instances
are known to be hard for deterministic mechanisms. In particular, the inapproximability of k-Facility
Location by anonymous deterministic strategyproof mechanisms, for all k ≥ 3, was proved in [6] for
instances with only n = k + 1 agents.
Motivation and Contribution. Our work is motivated by two natural questions related to approximate
mechanism design without money for k-Facility Location. The first question is about the approxima-
bility of k-Facility Location by randomized strategyproof mechanisms for instances with any number
of facilities and any number of agents. Prior to this work, we have only known randomized mecha-
nisms with a bounded3 approximation ratio if we have either at most 3 facilities or k facilities and
only n = k + 1 agents. Most importantly, all the randomized upper bounds in Fig. 1 are achieved
by mechanisms that balance between strategyproofness and efficiency using different approaches (see
e.g., [16,9,4]).
The second question is whether the restriction to linear cost functions is a necessary price to pay
for adopting the elegant optimization framework of Procaccia and Tennenholtz [16] and aiming at
a reasonable approximation ratio. In fact, we can imagine a few natural scenarios where the agents’
cost is best described by a convex or a concave non-decreasing cost function c(d) of their distance d
to the nearest facility. For example, a convex cost function captures the fact that the growth rate of
3 The approximation ratio of a mechanism for k-Facility Location is bounded if it is a function of n and k. We highlight
that this property is essentially objective-independent, since any mechanism with a bounded approximation ratio for e.g.,
MAX COST also has a bounded approximation for SOCIAL COST and for the objective of minimizing the Lp norm of
the agents’ costs, for any p ≥ 1, and vice versa.
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the people’s disutility from commuting increases with the distance (e.g., in addition to cost and time
considerations, people get more and more tired if they commute over long distances). On the other
hand, a concave cost function captures the fact that the growth rate of the traveling time decreases
with the distance (e.g., people walk over short distances, bike over medium distances, drive over long
distances, and take a plane over really long ones). To a certain extent, a setting where the agents’ cost
function is not fixed, but is given as part of the input, would be closer to the setting of general single-
peaked preferences in Social Choice. Then, a mechanism should be strategyproof, or even group
strategyproof, for any given cost function c, just as generalized median mechanisms are strategyproof
for any collection of single-peaked preferences, while the approximation ratio may also depend on
some quantitative properties (e.g., the derivative) of c. Notably, this holds for the class of percentile
mechanisms [19], which decide on the facility locations based on the ordering of the agents on the
line, are group strategyproof, and include the optimal (wrt. the approximation ratio for linear cost
functions) deterministic mechanisms for 1 and 2-Facility Location on the line. However, percentile
mechanisms have an unbounded approximation ratio for all k ≥ 3. In contrast, the strategyproofness
of known randomized mechanisms crucially depends on the linearity of the cost function (see e.g.,
[16, Mechanism 1] which is not strategyproof e.g., for c(d) =
√
d).
In this work, we make significant progress in both research directions above. Our main technical
contribution consists of two randomized mechanisms, called EQUAL COST and PICK THE LOSER,
that are group strategyproof and achieve a bounded approximation ratio for any number of facilities
and any given concave cost function.
EQUAL COST, presented in Section 3, applies to instances with any number of facilities k and any
number of agents n, and is the first (group) strategyproof mechanism with a bounded approximation
ratio for all k and n. Its approximation ratio is at most 2 for MAX COST and at most n for SOCIAL
COST, for all concave cost functions c. Combined with the lower bound of [16] for the objective of
MAX COST, this implies that the best approximation ratio achievable by randomized mechanisms for
k-Facility Location on the line and is at least 1.5 and at most 2, for all k and for all concave cost
functions. Moreover, we obtain an interesting separation between deterministic mechanisms, whose
approximation ratio for MAX COST jumps from 2 to unbounded when k increases from 2 to 3, and
randomized mechanisms, whose approximation ratio remains a small constant for all k.
From a technical viewpoint, EQUAL COST works by equalizing the expected cost of all agents.
The mechanism first covers the agents’ locations with k disjoint intervals of length ℓ, where ℓ is chosen
so that c(ℓ) is at most twice the optimal maximum cost of an agent. Then, taking the cost function
c into account, it computes a random variable X in [0, ℓ], so that all locations x ∈ [0, ℓ] have the
same expected cost, under c, if x is connected to a facility distributed in [0, ℓ] according to X. Finally,
EQUAL COST places a facility in each interval according to the random variable X so that all agents
have an expected cost equal to the expectation of c(X).
The key technical claim in the analysis of EQUAL COST is that if the cost function c is concave
and piecewise linear, a random variable X with the desired properties exists and can be computed
efficiently as the solution to a homogeneous system of linear equations (Lemma 3.2). This claim can
be generalized to any continuous concave function, but the technical details have to do with techniques
for the solution of integral equations and are beyond the scope of this work. We show that EQUAL
COST is (resp. strongly) group strategyproof for any given (resp. strictly) concave cost function c, and
that the agents’ expected cost is at most the maximum cost of an agent in the optimal solution for
the objective of MAX COST (Lemma 3.5). In addition to implying the approximation guarantees, the
upper bound on the expected cost of the agents indicates that the facility allocation of EQUAL COST
is fair in expectation, and does not unnecessarily increase the agents’ disutility.
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To demonstrate the natural behavior of EQUAL COST for typical cost functions, we derive the
exact form of the random variable X for three important cases: linear cost functions, piecewise linear
cost functions with two pieces, and exponential cost functions of the form c(d) = 1−e−λd (Section 4).
Moreover, we show how to implement EQUAL COST if the agents and the facilities should lie in a
bounded interval (Section 5). This implies that EQUAL COST can be applied to instances where the
agents lie on a circle metric, with the same approximation guarantees, but rather surprisingly, with
group strategyproofness carrying over only if the number of facilities is even.
On the negative side, we exclude the possibility of a mechanism with the properties of EQUAL
COST for strictly convex cost functions (Section 5.2). Specifically, we show that the expected cost of
the agents in the same interval cannot be equalized if the cost function c is strictly convex. Moreover,
employing an exponential cost function, we show (Lemma 5.2) that there does not exist a randomized
strategyproof mechanism with a bounded approximation ratio for any given convex cost function (note
that the approximation ratio here may also depend on the cost function).
In Section 6, we focus on the simpler and elegant setting where we have k facilities and only
n = k + 1 agents. This setting was motivated and studied in [4], and deserves special attention
not only because such instances are among the hardest ones for deterministic mechanisms (see e.g.,
[6, Theorem 7.1]), but also because they make EQUAL COST perform poorly for the objective of
SOCIAL COST. We present the PICK THE LOSER mechanism that allocates facilities to all but a single
agent, designated as the loser. The probability distribution according to which the loser is chosen is
motivated by the probability distribution used by [8] for scheduling on selfish unrelated machines.
Our key technical contribution here is to show that PICK THE LOSER is strongly group strategyproof
for any given concave cost function (Lemma 6.1). We also show that PICK THE LOSER achieves
an approximation ratio of 2 for the objective of SOCIAL COST. Thus, we significantly improve on
the previously best known approximation ratio of n/2 achieved by the INVERSELY PROPORTIONAL
mechanism of [4] for this class of instances. Moreover, the small approximation ratio of PICK THE
LOSER nicely complements the poor performance of EQUAL COST for such instances.
Other Related Work. For the objective of MAX COST, Alon et al. [1] almost completely character-
ized the approximation ratios achievable by randomized and deterministic mechanisms for 1-Facility
Location in general metrics and rings. For the objective of SOCIAL COST, Nissim et al. [15] and Fo-
takis and Tzamos [7] considered imposing randomized mechanisms that achieve an additive approx-
imation of o(n) and an approximation ratio of 4k for k-Facility Location on the line and in general
metric spaces, respectively. For 1-Facility Location on the line and the objective of minimizing the L2
norm of the agents’ distances to the facility, Feldman and Wilf [5] proved that the best approximation
ratio is 1.5 for randomized and 2 for deterministic mechanisms. Moreover, they presented a class of
randomized mechanisms that includes all known strategyproof mechanisms for 1-Facility Location on
the line.
2 Notation, Definitions, and Preliminaries
For a random variable X, we let IE[X] denote the expectation of X. For an event E in a sample space,
we let IPr[E] denote the probability that E occurs.
Instances. We consider k-Facility Location with k ≥ 1 facilities and n ≥ k + 1 agents on the real
line. We let N = {1, . . . , n} be the set of agents. Each agent i ∈ N resides at a location xi ∈ IR,
which is i’s private information. An instance is a tuple (x, c), where x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ IRn is the
agents’ locations profile and c : IR≥0 7→ IR≥0 is a cost function that gives the connection cost of each
agent. The cost function c is public knowledge and the same for all agents. Normalizing c, we assume
that c(0) = 0. If the cost function c is clear from the context, we let an instance simply consist of x.
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For an n-tuple x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ IRn, we let x−i = (x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn) be x without
xi. For a non-empty set S of indices, we let xS = (xi)i∈S and x−S = (xi)i 6∈S . We write (x−i, a) to
denote the tuple x with a in place of xi, (x−{i,j}, a, b) to denote the tuple x with a in place of xi and
b in place of xj , and so on.
Mechanisms. A deterministic mechanism F for k-Facility Location maps an instance (x, c) to a k-
tuple (y1, . . . , yk) ∈ IRk, y1 ≤ · · · ≤ yk, of facility locations. We let F (x, c) (or simply F (x),
whenever c is clear from the context) denote the outcome of F for instance (x, c), and let Fj(x, c)
denote yj , i.e., the j-th smallest coordinate in F (x, c). We write y ∈ F (x, c) to denote that F (x, c)
has a facility at location y. A randomized mechanism F maps an instance (x, c) to a probability
distribution over k-tuples (y1, . . . , yk) ∈ IRk.
Connection Cost, Social Cost, Maximum Cost. Given a k-tuple y = (y1, . . . , yk), y1 ≤ · · · ≤
yk, of facility locations, the connection cost of agent i with respect to y, denoted cost(xi,y), is
cost(xi,y) = c(min1≤j≤k |xi − yj|). Given a deterministic mechanism F and an instance (x, c), we
let cost(xi, F (x, c)) (or simply, cost(xi, F (x)), if c is clear from the context) denote the connection
cost of agent i with respect to the outcome of F (x, c). If F is a randomized mechanism, the expected
connection cost of agent i is
cost(xi, F (x, c)) = IEy∼F (x,c)[cost(xi,y)]
The MAX COST of a deterministic mechanism F for an instance (x, c) is
MC[F (x, c)] = maxi∈N cost(xi, F (x, c))
The expected MAX COST of a randomized mechanism F for an instance (x, c) is
MC[F (x, c)] = IEy∼F (x,c)[maxi∈N cost(xi,y)]
The optimal MAX COST, denoted MC∗(x, c), is MC∗(x, c) = min
y∈IRk maxi∈N cost(xi,y).
The (resp. expected) SOCIAL COST of a deterministic (resp. randomized) mechanism F for
an instance (x, c) is SC[F (x, c)] =
∑n
i=1 cost(xi, F (x, c)). The optimal SOCIAL COST, denoted
SC∗(x, c), is SC∗(x, c) = min
y∈IRk
∑n
i=1 cost(xi,y).
Approximation Ratio. A (randomized) mechanism F for k-Facility Location achieves an approxi-
mation ratio of ρ ≥ 1 for a class of cost functions C and the objective of MAX COST (resp. SOCIAL
COST), if for all cost functions c ∈ C and all location profiles x, MC[F (x, c)] ≤ ρMC∗(x, c) (resp.
SC[F (x, c)] ≤ ρSC∗(x, c) ).
Strategyproofness and Group Strategyproofness. A mechanism F is strategyproof for a class of
cost functions C if no agent can benefit from misreporting his location. Formally, F is strategyproof
if for all cost functions c ∈ C, all location profiles x, any agent i, and all locations y,
cost(xi, F (x, c)) ≤ cost(xi, F ((x−i, y), c)) .
A mechanism F is (weakly) group strategyproof for a class of cost functions C if for any coalition
of agents misreporting their locations, at least one of them does not benefit. Formally, F is (weakly)
group strategyproof if for all cost functions c ∈ C, all location profiles x, any non-empty coalition S,
and all location profiles yS for S, there exists some agent i ∈ S such that
cost(xi, F (x, c)) ≤ cost(xi, F ((x−S ,yS), c)) .
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A mechanism F is strongly group strategyproof for a class of cost functions C if there is no
coalition S of agents misreporting their locations where at least one agent in S benefits and the other
agents in S do not lose from the deviation. Formally, F is strongly group strategyproof if for all cost
functions c ∈ C and all location profiles x, there do not exist a non-empty coalition S and a location
profile yS for S, such that for all i ∈ S,
cost(xi, F (x, c)) ≥ cost(xi, F ((x−S ,yS), c)) ,
and there exists some agent j ∈ S with
cost(xi, F (x, c)) > cost(xi, F ((x−S ,yS), c)) .
3 The EQUAL-COST Mechanism
In this section, we present and analyze the EQUAL COST mechanism. At the conceptual level, EQUAL
COST, or EC, in short, works by equalizing the expected cost of all agents. Given an instance (x, c)
of k-Facility Location on the line, EC works as follows:
Step 1 It computes an optimal covering of all agent locations with k disjoint intervals [αi, αi+ ℓ] that
minimizes the interval length ℓ (wlog., we assume that αi < αi+1).
Step 2 It constructs a random variable X(ℓ) ∈ [0, ℓ] such that all locations x ∈ [0, ℓ] have the same
the expected connection cost IE[c(|x−X|)].
Step 3 For every interval [αi, αi + ℓ], EC places a facility at αi +X, if i is odd, or at αi + ℓ−X, if
i is even.
We proceed to establish the main properties of EC, summarized by the following theorem. For the
proof, we examine, in the following sections, each step of the mechanism separately.
Theorem 3.1. For the class of all concave cost functions, EQUAL COST is group strategyproof and
achieves an approximation ratio of 2 for the objective of MAX COST, and an approximation ratio of
n for the objective of SOCIAL COST. Moreover, for every instance (x, c), with c concave, and every
agent i, cost(xi,EC(x, c)) ≤ MC∗(x, c).
3.1 Step 1: Partitioning the Instance in Intervals
We can compute the minimum feasible interval length ℓ by checking all possible candidate values.
The value of ℓ is equal to the distance xj − xi for some agent locations xj ≤ xi. So, there are at
most n2/2 candidate values for ℓ. For each candidate value ℓ′, we can check feasibility and compute
a covering of all locations in x with intervals of length ℓ′ as follows:
While there are uncovered agents, find the leftmost uncovered agent i, and create a new inter-
val [xi, xi + ℓ′].
The above algorithm computes the minimum number of intervals of length ℓ′ to cover x. If this
number is at most k, we set ℓ = ℓ′. We can also speed up the algorithm by binary search over the
space of candidate values.
We observe that the partitioning into intervals of length ℓ is closely related to the optimal maxi-
mum cost MC∗(x, c). In fact, an optimal solution can be obtained by placing a facility at the midpoint
of each interval. Thus, the cost of the optimal solution is MC∗(x, c) = c(ℓ/2).
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3.2 Step 2: Constructing the Random Variable
We next show that for any given cost function c, we can construct a family of random variables
X(ℓ) ∈ [0, ℓ] such the expected cost of every point in [0, ℓ] is the same. For convenience, we denote
this cost as C(ℓ). We note that C(ℓ) = IE[c(|X(ℓ) − x|)], for all x ∈ [0, ℓ]. In particular, for x = 0,
we get C(ℓ) = IE[c(X(ℓ))].
We assume that the cost function c is piecewise-linear with pieces of length 1 and growth rates
λ0, λ1, . . . , λi, . . ., where λi is the growth rate in the interval [i, i−1). For all i, λi > 0 and λi ≥ λi+1,
because c is strictly increasing and concave. Our result applies to general concave functions either by
discretizing appropriately, or by solving a continuous analog of the homogeneous linear system below
through an integral equation. The technical details are related to the solution of integral equations and
are beyond the scope of this work.
The support S of the random variable X(ℓ) is every point i and ℓ − i, for integer i = 0, . . . , ⌊ℓ⌋.
We note that if ℓ is an integer, we have only |S| = ℓ + 1 points in the support, instead of |S| =
2(⌊ℓ⌋+1) points in general. The crucial observation is that the derivative of the expected cost function
in every interval between consecutive points in the support must be 0. So, to compute the probability
pj assigned to each point j in the support of X(ℓ), we write a set of |S| − 1 linear equations and
|S| unknowns (the probability pj of each point j in the support) requiring that the derivative of the
expected cost function in each interval is 0. So, we get the homogeneous linear system Λp = 0. If ℓ
is an integer, the matrix Λ is:
Λ =


λ0 −λ0 −λ1 . . . −λℓ−1
λ1 λ0 −λ0 . . . −λℓ−2
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
λℓ−1 λℓ−2 λℓ−3 . . . −λ0


Namely, the elements of the matrix Λ are Λi,j = λi−j , if i ≥ j, and Λi,j = λj−i−1, if i < j, for
all i = 0, . . . , ℓ − 1 and j = 0, . . . , ℓ, where λκ denotes the growth rate of the piecewise-linear cost
function c at the support point κ.
If ℓ is not an integer, the elements of the matrix Λ are Λi,j = λ⌊(i−j)/2⌋, if i ≥ j, and Λi,j =
λ⌊(j−i−1)/2⌋, if i < j, for all i = 0, . . . , 2⌊ℓ⌋ and j = 0, . . . , 2⌊ℓ⌋ + 1. Thus,
Λ =


λ0 −λ0 −λ0 −λ1 −λ1 −λ2 −λ2 . . . −λ⌊ℓ⌋−1 −λ⌊ℓ⌋−1 −λ⌊ℓ⌋
λ0 λ0 −λ0 −λ0 −λ1 −λ1 −λ2 −λ2 . . . −λ⌊ℓ⌋−1 −λ⌊ℓ⌋−1
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
λ⌊ℓ⌋ λ⌊ℓ⌋−1 λ⌊ℓ⌋−1 . . . . . . . . . λ1 λ1 λ0 λ0 −λ0


We now show that in both cases there is a unique symmetric probability distribution that satisfies
the system of equations. For this purpose, we use the two lemmas below. The first lemma is about a
class of diagonally dominant matrices. It shows that we can bring any such matrix in a triangular form
by performing Gaussian elimination, such that all diagonal elements are positive and all off-diagonal
elements are less than or equal to 0.
Lemma 3.1. Let A be a q × n, q ≤ n matrix so that Ai,i > 0, for all i = 1, . . . , q, Ai,j ≤ 0, for
all i 6= j, and ∑qi=1Ai,j > 0, for all j = 1, . . . , q. Then, by performing elementary row operations
(Gaussian elimination) on A, we can get a row-echelon form A′ where A′i,i > 0, for all i = 1, . . . , q,
A′i,j = 0, for all i > j, and A′i,j ≤ 0, for all i < j.
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Proof. We use induction on q. The base case, where q = 1, is already in the desired form. Assuming
that the lemma holds for q ≥ 1, we show that it holds for q + 1.
We have that A =
(
a uT
v B
)
, with a > 0 and all elements of u and v non-positive. With a single
step of Gaussian elimination, we get
(
a uT
0 B − v×uTa
)
. To conclude the induction step, we show that
the submatrix B′ = B − v×uTa satisfies the properties of the lemma. Since all elements of v × uT
are non-negative, we still have B′i,j ≤ 0, for all i 6= j. So, we need to show that
∑q
i=1B
′
i,j > 0, for
all columns j = 1, . . . , q, which also implies that B′i,i > 0, for all i = 1, . . . , q. For any column j, we
have that:
q∑
i=1
B′i,j =
q∑
i=1
(Bi,j − viuj/a) =
q∑
i=1
Bi,j − uja
q∑
i=1
vi > −uj − uja (−a) = 0 .
For the last inequality, we use that uj ≤ 0, and the hypothesis that
∑q+1
i=1 Ai,j > 0, which implies that
a+
∑q
i=1 vi > 0 and that uj +
∑q
i=1Bi,j > 0. ⊓⊔
The next lemma shows that for the special class of matrices Λ arising in our case, there is a solution
to the homogeneous linear system Λp = 0 that defines a probability distribution.
Lemma 3.2. LetA be a n×(n+1)matrix defined as Ai,j = ai−j , where a−n, . . . , an−1 is a sequence
of positive numbers such that am−1 = −a−m, for all m ≥ −n, and am−1 ≥ am for all m ≥ 1. Then,
the system Ap = 0 has a symmetric solution with pj = pn−j ,
∑
pj = 1, and pj ≥ 0. Moreover, there
is a unique symmetric solution p that satisfies these conditions.
Proof. We let dm = am−1 − am ≥ 0, for m ≥ 1. Then, the matrix A can be written as:

a0 −a0 −a1 . . . −an−1
a1 a0 −a0 . . . −an−2
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
an−1 . . . . . . . . . −a0

=


a0 −a0 −a0 + d1 . . . −a0 +
∑n−1
m=1 dm
a0 − d1 a0 −a0 . . . −a0 +
∑n−2
m=1 dm
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
a0 −
∑n−1
m=1 dm . . . . . . . . . −a0


Taking the difference of every pair of A’s consecutive rows, we obtain the (n−1)×(n+1) matrix
A′ =


−d1 2a0 −d1 . . . −dn−1
−d2 −d1 2a0 . . . −dn−2
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
−dn−2 −dn−3 . . . −d1 −d2
−dn−1 −dn−2 . . . 2a0 −d1


To establish the lemma, we first use Lemma 3.1 and show that (i) the nullspace of A′ contains a unique
symmetric probability vector p, and then show that (ii) the particular vector p is also in the nullspace
of A.
As for claim (i), we first show that each coordinate pj of any vector p in the nullspace of A′
can be expressed as a non-negative linear combination of the coordinates p0 and pn. Formally, we
show that for any coordinate pj of any solution p of A′p = 0, there exist πj, ρj ≥ 0, such that
pj = πjp0 + ρjpn. To this end, we consider the (n − 1) × (n + 1) matrix A′′, which is obtained
from A′ by moving the first column of A′ to the end. We observe that A′′ satisfies the conditions of
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Lemma 3.1, since
∑n−1
m=1 dm = a0−an−1 < a0, and thus 2a0−2
∑n−1
m=1 dm > 0. Hence, by applying
Gaussian elimination to A′′, we get a (n−1)× (n+1) matrix G in a row-echelon form with Gi,i > 0,
for all i, Gi,j = 0, for all i > j, and Gi,j ≤ 0, for all i < j. Moreover, the nullspace of A′ essentially
consists of the solutions x to the homogenous linear system Gx = 0. More precisely, any solution x
of Gx = 0 corresponds to a solution p of A′p = 0, where p0 = xn, p1 = x0, . . . , pn = xn−1, and
vice versa.
Due to the special form of G, we can find all solutions x of Gx = 0 by assigning values to the
free variables xn−1 and xn and performing backwards substitution so that we uniquely determine the
values of the variables x0, . . . , xn−2. Furthermore, due to the special form of G, this procedure results
in expressing each variable xj as a non-negative linear combination of xn−1 and xn. Specifically, we
can calculate xj , for all j = n− 2, . . . , 0, from the equation
∑n
i=0Gj,ixi = 0. Solving for xj , we get
xj = −
∑n
i=j+1Gj,ixi/Gj,j , since Gj,j > 0 and Gj,i = 0, for all j > i. Moreover, all coefficients
−Gj,i/Gj,j are non-negative because Gj,i ≤ 0, for all j < i, and Gj,j > 0. By induction, if every xj′ ,
j′ > j, is a non-negative linear combination of xn−1 and xn, the same holds for xj . Therefore, any
coordinate xj of any solution x to Gx = 0 can be expressed as a non-negative linear combination of
the free variables xn−1 and xn. Due to the aforementioned correspondence between the solutions p
of A′p = 0 and the solutions x of Gx = 0, we obtain that for any coordinate pj of any solution p to
A′p = 0, there exist πj, ρj ≥ 0, such that pj = πjp0 + ρjpn.
Hence, the nullspace of A′ is spanned by the vectors p1 and p2 determined by setting the free
variables p0 and pn to (1, 0) and to (0, 1), respectively. By the discussion above, all the coordinates of
p
1 and p2 are non-negative. To conclude the proof of claim (i), we observe that due to the symmetry
of the homogeneous linear system A′p = 0, we have that p1j = p2n−j , for all j = 0, . . . , n. Therefore,
there is unique symmetric vector in the nullspace of A′ with L1 norm equal to 1, namely the vector
p = (p1 + p2)/|p1 + p2|1.
We proceed to show claim (ii), namely that the unique symmetric probability vector p in the
nullspace of A′ is also in the nullspace of A. To this end, we define the n× n matrix
M =


1 0 0 . . . 1
−1 1 0 . . . 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0 . . . −1 1 0
0 . . . 0 −1 1


We observe that the determinant of M is equal to 2, and thus M is non-singular. Therefore, the linear
system Ap = 0 is equivalent to the linear system MAp = 0. So, we let A1 and An be the first and
the last row of A, and further observe that MA is a n × (n + 1) matrix with its first row equal to
A1+An and its remaining rows in one-to-one correspondence to the rows of A′. Since p is the unique
symmetric probability vector satisfying A′p = 0, we only need to show that (A1 +An)p = 0, which
follows immediately from the symmetry of p. This completes the proof of claim (ii) and the proof of
the lemma. ⊓⊔
For every ℓ, the homogeneous linear system Λp = 0 satisfies the conditions of Lemma 3.2. Hence,
there exists a unique symmetric probability distribution p such that the expected cost IE[c(|X(ℓ)−x|)]
is the same for every location x ∈ [0, ℓ]. Next, we think of this unique symmetric solution p as a
function of ℓ, and establish a nice continuity property of it.
To this end, we fix an integer m ≥ 0, and show that the random variable X(ℓ) converges in
probability to the random variable X(m), as ℓ→ m+. We observe that the linear system determining
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p is the same for all ℓ ∈ (m,m + 1). So, we let pmi be the probability assigned to each integer point
i, 0 ≤ i ≤ m. By symmetry, the probability assigned to each point ℓ − i, 0 ≤ i ≤ m, is also pmi .
The limit limℓ→m+ X(ℓ) = X¯ is a random variable distributed according to a probability distribution
that assigns probability pmi + pmm−i to each integer point i, 0 ≤ i ≤ m. Since the distribution is
symmetric and achieves the same expected cost for all points x ∈ [0,m], it is, by Lemma 3.2, the
unique distribution with these properties. Therefore, we have that X(m) = X¯. By the same argument,
we can show that the random variable X(ℓ) converges in probability to the random variable X(m+1),
as ℓ→ (m+ 1)−.
By the continuity property above, the expected cost C(ℓ) = IE [c (X(ℓ))] at each location x ∈
[0, ℓ] is a continuous function of ℓ. Moreover, the discussion above implies that for all ℓ ∈ [m,m+1),
C(ℓ) =
∑m
i=0 p
m
i (c(i) + c(ℓ − i)). Using these properties, we now show that C(ℓ) is an increasing
function of ℓ.
Lemma 3.3. The expected cost C(ℓ) is an increasing function of the interval length ℓ.
Proof. Since C is continuous, we only need to show that C is increasing in each interval [m,m+ 1),
where m ≥ 0 is any integer. To this end, we let ℓ ∈ [m,m + 1), and consider any ℓ′ ∈ (ℓ,m + 1).
Then, we have that:
C(ℓ) = E [c(X(ℓ))] =
m∑
i=0
pmi (c(i) + c(ℓ− i)) <
m∑
i=0
pmi (c(i) + c(ℓ
′ − i)) = C(ℓ′) ,
where the inequality holds because ℓ′ > ℓ and the cost function c is increasing. ⊓⊔
3.3 Step 3: Establishing Group Strategyproofness
We next prove that the random facility placement, in Step 3 of EQUAL COST, is group strategyproof.
The correlation of the facility placement, in Step 3, ensures that if an agent j is located at y, his closest
facility is always the one assigned to his closest interval. To justify this, let us consider any sample x
of the random variable X. We recall that the facilities are placed at α1+x, α2+ ℓ−x, α3+x, . . .. Let
us assume that αi+ ℓ− x ≤ y ≤ αi+1 + x. Then, the distance of y to αi + ℓ− x is y− (αi + ℓ− x),
while the distance of y to αi+1 + x is αi+1 + x− y. Hence, agent j prefers the facility at interval i if
and only if y − (αi + ℓ) < αi+1 − y, i.e., the right endpoint of interval i is closer to y than the left
endpoint of interval i+ 1.
To show that EQUAL COST is group strategyproof, we consider a coalition of agents S that deviate
to improve their cost. Let the original interval length, with respect to the true agents’ locations, be ℓ,
and let the new interval length, after the deviation, be ℓ′. We now consider the two possible outcomes
when the agents misreport their locations:
Case where ℓ′ ≥ ℓ. Let i be any agent. If i’s true location is covered by some interval of the new
covering, i incurs an expected cost of C(ℓ′) ≥ C(ℓ). Otherwise, agent i incurs an expected cost no
less than C(ℓ′), which is greater than C(ℓ).
Case where ℓ′ < ℓ. We consider the distance of any agent to the nearest midpoint of an interval. The
locations of the truthful agents in N \S are covered by some interval of the new covering. Hence, their
distance to the nearest midpoint of some interval is at most ℓ′/2. On the other hand, if we consider
the true locations of all agents and any feasible covering of them with k intervals, there is some
agent whose distance to the midpoint of the interval covering him is at least ℓ/2. Therefore, there is
an agent i whose distance d to the nearest midpoint of some interval in the new covering (after the
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deviation) is at least ℓ/2. Hence, agent i must be in the deviating coalition S, and his true location
must not be covered by the intervals of the new covering. In this case, Lemma 3.4 below implies that
the expected cost of agent i after the deviation, which is IE[c(d− ℓ′/2+X(ℓ′))], is at least as large as
IE[c(X(2d))] = C(2d) ≥ C(ℓ). This implies that EQUAL COST is group strategyproof.
Lemma 3.4. For all a, a′, b, with 0 ≤ a < a′ ≤ b, it holds that
IE[c(b− a+X(2a))] ≥ IE[c(b − a′ +X(2a′))]
Moreover, the inequality is strict, if the function c is strictly concave.
Proof. Letm ≥ 0 be any integer. We only need to show that the lemma holds for all a, a′ ∈ [m2 , m+12 ),
with 0 ≤ a < a′ ≤ b. For all such a, a′, b, we have that:
IE[c(b− a+X(2a))] =
m∑
i=0
pmi (c(b− a+ i) + c(b+ a− i))
≥
m∑
i=0
pmi (c(b− a′ + i) + c(b+ a′ − i)) = IE[c(b− a′ +X(2a′))]
where the inequality holds because a < a′ and c is concave. In fact, the inequality is strict if c is
strictly concave. ⊓⊔
3.4 Approximation Ratio
In this section, we analyze the approximation ratio of EQUAL COST.
Lemma 3.5. For any concave cost function c, any locations profile x, and any agent i, it holds that
cost(xi,EC(x, c)) ≤ MC∗(x, c).
Proof. We let ℓ be the minimum interval length in Step 1 of EQUAL COST, and let m = ⌊ℓ⌋. We
recall that MC∗(x, c) = c(ℓ/2). Moreover, we have that:
C(ℓ) =
m∑
i=0
pmi (c(i) + c(ℓ− i)) ≤
m∑
i=0
2pmi c(ℓ/2) = c(ℓ/2)
where the inequality follows from the concavity of the cost function c. ⊓⊔
Lemma 3.6. For every concave cost function c, EQUAL COST has an approximation ratio of at most
2 for the objective of MAX COST.
Proof. Let (x, c) be any instance with a concave cost function c, and let ℓ be the minimum interval
length in Step 1 of EQUAL COST. In EC(x, c), every agent i has a facility at distance at most ℓ to xi.
On the other hand, MC∗(x, c) = c(ℓ/2). Therefore, the approximation ratio is at most:
c(ℓ)
c(ℓ/2)
=
c(ℓ) + c(0)
c(ℓ/2)
≤ 2c(ℓ/2)
c(ℓ/2)
= 2 ,
where we use that c(0) = 0, by normalization, and the concavity of c. ⊓⊔
Lemma 3.7. For every concave cost function c, EQUAL COST has an approximation ratio of at most
n for the objective of SOCIAL COST.
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Proof. For every locations profile x, MC∗(x, c) ≤ SC∗(x, c). Then,
SC(x, c) =
∑
i∈N
cost(xi,EC(x, c)) ≤ nMC∗(x, c) ≤ n SC∗(x, c) ,
where the inequality follows from Lemma 3.5. ⊓⊔
4 Applications
In this section, we consider three typical examples of concave cost functions, and derive closed form
solutions for the corresponding random variables X(ℓ).
Linear Functions. The literature mostly focuses on linear cost functions c(d) = λd, where the agents’
cost is proportional to their distance to the nearest facility. In this case, X(ℓ) has a nice closed form:
it is either 0 with probability 1/2 or ℓ with probability 1/2. Then, the expected connection cost of any
location x ∈ [0, ℓ] is:
c(x)/2 + c(ℓ− x)/2 = λx/2 + λ(ℓ− x)/2 = 2λℓ/2 ,
which does not depend on x.
Two-Piece Piecewise Linear Functions. For some λ1 > λ2 > 0, let the cost function c be:
c(d) =
{
λ1d for d ≤ 1
λ2d+ (λ1 − λ2) for d > 1
To achieve the same expected cost at all locations, we find ℓ, let m = ⌊ℓ⌋, and compute the
probability distribution of X(ℓ) by solving the following linear system:


λ1 −λ1 −λ1 −λ2 −λ2 −λ2 −λ2 . . . −λ2 −λ2 −λ2
λ1 λ1 −λ1 −λ1 −λ2 −λ2 −λ2 −λ2 . . . −λ2 −λ2
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
λ2 λ2 λ2 . . . . . . . . . λ2 λ2 λ1 λ1 −λ1




pm0
pmm
pm1
pmm−1
.
.
.
pmm
pm0


= 0
Taking the difference between every two consecutive rows, as in Lemma 3.2, we find that:
pmi =
λ1 − λ2
2λ1
(pmi−1 + p
m
i+1) for all integers i 0 ≤ i ≤ m,
where we define pmi = 0, for all integers i 6∈ [0,m]. Then, the solution of the recurrence is:
pmi =
ρm+1−i1 + ρ
m+1−i
2
2
∑m+1
j=1
(
ρj1 + ρ
j
2
)
where ρ1 =
λ1 +
√
λ21 − (λ1 − λ2)2
λ1 − λ2 and ρ2 =
λ1 −
√
λ21 − (λ1 − λ2)2
λ1 − λ2
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Exponential Functions. A concave cost function that results in a continuous probability distribution
X(ℓ) is the exponential function c(d) = 1 − e−λd. Then, X(ℓ) is 0, with probability 1ℓλ+2 , ℓ, with
probability 1ℓλ+2 , and uniform in (0, ℓ), with probability
ℓλ
ℓλ+2 .
We let X(ℓ) be 0, with probability 1ℓλ+2 , ℓ, with probability
1
ℓλ+2 , and uniform in (0, ℓ), with
probability ℓλℓλ+2 . We next show that the expected connection cost of any location x ∈ [0, ℓ] does not
depend on x. In particular, the expected connection cost of any location x is:
1
ℓλ+ 2
c(x) +
1
ℓλ+ 2
c(ℓ− x) + ℓλ
ℓλ+ 2
∫ ℓ
0
1
ℓ
c(|t− x|)dt =
c(x) + c(ℓ− x)
ℓλ+ 2
+
λ
ℓλ+ 2
∫ x
0
c(x− t)ℓt+ λ
ℓλ+ 2
∫ ℓ
x
c(t− x)dt =
2− e−λx − e−λ(ℓ−x)
ℓλ+ 2
+
λ
ℓλ+ 2
(∫ x
0
1− e−λ(x−t)dt+
∫ ℓ
x
1− e−λ(t−x)dt
)
=
2− e−λx − e−λ(ℓ−x)
ℓλ+ 2
+
λ
ℓλ+ 2
(
ℓ−
∫ x
0
e−λ(x−t)dt+
∫ ℓ
x
e−λ(t−x)dt
)
=
2− e−λx − e−λ(ℓ−x)
ℓλ+ 2
+
λ
ℓλ+ 2
(
ℓ− 1− e
−λx
λ
− 1− e
−λ(ℓ−x)
λ
)
=
ℓλ
ℓλ+ 2
which does not depend on x.
5 Extensions and Limitations
5.1 EQUAL COST in Bounded Intervals
Our results about the properties of EQUAL COST apply to the real line (−∞,∞) and to the half-line
[0,∞). If the metric space is a bounded interval [0, L], it could be that in the construction of the
covering, in Step 1, the last interval does not fit entirely in [0, L]. The following lemma shows that
even in this case, we can adjust the covering with disjoint intervals of the same length, computed in
Step 1, so that all intervals fit in [0, L].
Lemma 5.1. Given a locations profile x in [0, L], there is an optimal covering of x with k disjoint
intervals of the same (minimum) length that all lie entirely in [0, L].
Proof. We consider a covering of x with k disjoint intervals of the same minimum length ℓ, computed
as in Section 3.1. As in Step 1 of EQUAL COST, we number the intervals from left to right, and let the
i-th interval be [αi, αi+ℓ]. Since all the locations of x lie in [0, L], we obtain that ℓ ≤ L/k. Moreover,
by construction, we have that αi ≥ 0, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k. However, it could be αi + ℓ > L for some
interval i. In this case, we construct a new covering using the intervals [α′i, α′i+ℓ], i = 1, . . . , k, where
α′i = min{αi, L− (k+1− i)ℓ}. To show that this is indeed an admissible covering of x, we observe
that:
(i) All intervals lie entirely in [0, L]: For every i, α′i ≥ 0, since αi ≥ 0, and L − (k + 1 − i)ℓ ≥ 0,
because ℓ ≤ L/k. Furthermore, α′i + ℓ ≤ L− (k + 1− i)ℓ+ ℓ ≤ L− (k − i)ℓ ≤ L.
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(ii) All intervals are disjoint: For any two consecutive intervals i and i+ 1, we have that:
α′i+1 − α′i = min{αi+1, L− (k + 1− i− 1)ℓ} −min{αi, L− (k + 1− i)ℓ}
≥ min{αi + ℓ, L− (k + 1− i− 1)ℓ} −min{αi, L− (k + 1− i)ℓ}
= ℓ+min{αi, L− (k + 1− i)ℓ} −min{αi, L− (k + 1− i)ℓ}
= ℓ
(iii) The intervals cover all locations of x: Let us consider a location x ∈ [αi, αi + ℓ]. If α′i = αi, x
is covered since the interval does not change. Otherwise, α′i = L − (k + 1 − i)ℓ. Thus, the interval
[α′i, L] has a length of L− α′i = (k + 1− i)ℓ, and consists of k + 1− i disjoint intervals of length ℓ.
Therefore, the intervals [α′j , α′j + ℓ], for j ≥ i, entirely cover the interval [α′i, L] ⊃ [αi, L], and thus,
they also cover the location x. ⊓⊔
Lemma 5.1 implies that if the agents lie on a circle, we can also cover their locations with disjoint
intervals of the same minimum length ℓ. Then, we can apply Steps 2 and 3 to the resulting intervals
on the circle. But rather surprisingly, EQUAL COST is guaranteed to be strategyproof for k-Facility
Location on the circle only if k is even. Otherwise, some agents in the first interval may prefer the
facility placed in the last interval, which violates the property that each agent always prefers the facility
in his own interval.
5.2 Convex Cost Functions
The approach of EQUAL COST does not apply to strictly convex functions c, because it is no longer
possible to equalize the expected cost of all agents. To see this, let us consider the interval [0, ℓ], and
the expected cost of two agents, one located at 0 and the other at ℓ. Since IE[c(X)] + IE[c(ℓ−X)] >
IE[2c(ℓ/2)] = 2c(ℓ/2), by the strict convexity of c, at least one of them incurs an expected cost greater
than c(ℓ/2). However, a third agent located at ℓ/2 incurs an expected cost no greater than c(ℓ/2), since
his distance to the facility is at most ℓ/2. Moreover, we can show that:
Lemma 5.2. There is no randomized strategyproof mechanism that achieves a bounded approxima-
tion ratio for the class of all convex functions.
Proof. We recall that the property of a bounded approximation ratio is objective-independent. So,
we next focus on the objective of MAX COST. For the proof, we consider the convex cost function
c(d) = ed and instances with 2 agents and a single facility. For sake of contradiction, we assume that
there exists a randomized strategyproof mechanism that achieves an approximation ratio of r for such
instances. Next, we let X denote the random variable that determines where the mechanism places
the facility.
We first consider an instance x = (x1, x2), with x2 > x1, If the facility is placed at location
t ≤ (x1+x2)/2, agent 2 incurs the maximum cost equal to ex2−t. If the facility is placed at t > (x1+
x2)/2, agent 1 incurs the maximum cost equal to et−x1 . In both cases, the maximum cost is equal to
e(x2−x1)/2+|t−(x1+x2)/2|, and the expectation of the maximum cost is IE[e(x2−x1)/2+|X−(x1+x2)/2|] ≤
re(x2−x1)/2, which implies that IE[e|X−(x1+x2)/2|] ≤ r.
Let us now consider the probabilities pl = IPr[X ≤ x1+x22 ] and pr = IPr[X ≥ x1+x22 ]. Since
pl + pr ≥ 1, one of them is at least 1/2. Wlog., let us assume that pl ≥ 1/2, which implies that agent
2 incurs an expected cost of at least 12e
(x2−x1)/2
.
Next, we consider an instance x′ = (x′1, x′2), with x′1 = x1 and x′2 = 2x2 − x1. By the choice
of x′, IE[e|X−(x′1+x′2)/2|] = IE[e|X−(x1+2x2−x1)/2|] = IE[e|X−x2|]. Working as before, we obtain that
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IE[e|X−(x
′
1+x
′
2)/2|] = IE[e|X−x2|] ≤ r, due to the approximation ratio of the mechanism. Moreover,
IE[e|X−x2|] is the expected cost of an agent located at x2, and due to strategyproofness, is no less than
the expected cost of agent 2 in instance x. Otherwise agent 2 would have an incentive to report x′2,
instead of x2. Therefore, IE[e|X−x2|] ≥ 12e(x2−x1)/2. Combining the upper and the lower bound on
IE[e|X−x2|], we obtain that e(x2−x1)/2 ≤ 2r. This leads to a contradiction if we consider an instance
x with x2 − x1 > 2 ln(2r). ⊓⊔
5.3 Other Cost Functions
EQUAL COST can also apply to some other (non-convex) cost functions, for which the expected cost
of all agents can be equalized. A notable such example is a cost function cr(d) which is 0, if d < r,
and 1 otherwise. Thus, cr correspond to agents that only care about getting a facility within a radius r
from their location. In this case, one could apply EQUAL COST as follows: First, we find a covering
of the agent locations with intervals of length ℓ, as in Step 1. Then if ℓ ≤ 2r, we place a facility at the
midpoint of each interval. Otherwise, we do not place any facilities (and let each agent incur a cost of
1). This clearly satisfies the equal cost property since the cost incurred by all agents is either 0 or 1.
The mechanism is optimal for the objective of MAX COST because every agent incurs a cost of 0, if
the optimal solution satisfies all agents, and a cost of 1, otherwise. On the other hand, the mechanism
is n approximate for the objective of SOCIAL COST, since in case where the optimal solution satisfies
all but one agents, resulting in a social cost of 1, the mechanism does not place any facilities, and
incurs a social cost of n.
6 The PICK THE LOSER Mechanism
EQUAL COST performs well for the objective of MAX COST, but may perform poorly for the objective
of SOCIAL COST. An extreme case is when we have k facilities and only n = k + 1 agents. Then,
there are many facilities, and one could easily satisfy all but one agents. Nevertheless, EQUAL COST
causes all agents to incur a high cost (equal to the min-max cost for linear cost functions).
In certain cases, this might not be acceptable, and one needs to find a more efficient mechanism.
In this section, we present a mechanism that, for instances with only n = k + 1 agents, selects the
loser, i.e., the agent not allocated a facility at his location, in a group strategyproof way. We also show
that this mechanism is quite efficient for the SOCIAL COST objective, which for such instances, is
equal to the cost of the loser.
Given an instance (x, c) of k-Facility Location on the line with only n = k + 1 agents, the
PICK-THE-LOSER mechanism, of PtL in short, works as follows:
Step 1 It numbers the agents according to their reported locations such that xi < xi+1, and lets E
and O be the sets of even and odd numbered agents, respectively. For every odd-numbered agent
i ∈ O, PtL places a facility at xi.
Step 2 For each even numbered agent i, PtL samples a number si uniformly in (0, 1), and computes
i’s current cost κi = minj 6=i c(|xj − xi|) and i’s scaled cost κˆi = κi/si.
Step 3 PtL finds the agent with the smallest scaled cost, and declares him the loser. Then, PtL places
facilities at the locations of all other agents.
In the following, we first show that PICK THE LOSER is strategyproof (Lemma 6.1). Then, in
Section 6.2, we use strategyproofness, and deal with the case where a coalition of agents may deviate,
thus establishing that the mechanism is strongly group strategyproof. Finally, in Section 6.3, we prove
the mechanism’s approximation guarantee. Thus, we obtain:
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Theorem 6.1. For the class of all concave cost functions, PICK THE LOSER is strongly group strate-
gyproof and achieves an approximation ratio of 2 for the SOCIAL COST objective.
For the proof, we assume wlog. that the agent locations are all distinct. Otherwise, we allocate a
facility to all distinct locations, thus being trivially both optimal and group strategyproof. We let qi(x)
denote the probability that agent i is designated as a loser. We have that qi(x) = 0 for all odd numbered
agents in x. For an even numbered agent i, we can compute this probability by the following thought
experiment: With all the samples sj ∈ (0, 1) fixed, agent i is selected if for all j ∈ E, κˆj ≥ κˆi,
or equivalently if sj ≤ siκj/κi. This happens with probability
∏
j∈E\{i}min{1, siκj/κi}. Setting
t = si/κi and taking the expectation over all different values of t, we have that
qi(x) = κi
∫ 1/κi
0
∏
j∈E\{i}
min{1, κjt}dt
6.1 Strategyproofness
The following lemma implies that PICK THE LOSER is strategyproof for the class of all concave cost
functions. Next, in Section 6.2, we use this property, to establish that PICK THE LOSER is strongly
group strategyproof for the class of all concave cost functions.
Lemma 6.1. Let (x, c) be any instance with a concave cost function c and only n = k+1 agents occu-
pying n distinct locations. Then, for every agent i and every location x′i 6= xi, cost(xi,PtL(x, c)) <
cost(xi,PtL((x−i, x
′
i), c)).
Proof. For convenience, we let x′ = (x−i, x′i). We also recall that by normalizing c, we assume that
c(0) = 0. If agent i is an odd numbered agent, he strictly prefers x over x′, because in x, there is a
facility at xi and agent i incurs 0 cost, while in x′i, there is no facility at xi, and thus agent i incurs a
positive cost.
If i is an even numbered agent, we let δ = minj 6=i{|xi− xj|} and δ′ = minj 6=i{|x′i− xj|} denote
the minimum distance of the reported location of i to the location of another agent. In the instance x,
if agent i is not allocated a facility at xi, he incurs a cost of c(δ). Otherwise, agent i incurs 0 cost.
Since δ > 0 and the cost function in increasing c, we have that c(δ) > 0. We next consider three
different cases, and show that in each case, agent i prefers x to x′.
Case where x′i 6∈ (xi − δ, xi + δ). Then, in x′, agent i incurs an expected cost of at least c(δ), while
in x, he incurs an expected cost less than c(δ), since he is allocated a facility at xi with positive
probability.
Case where x′i ∈ (xi − δ, xi + δ) and δ′ ≤ δ. In this case, the probability qi(x′) that agent i is not
allocated a facility at x′i, in instance x′, is greater than or equal to qi(x). This holds because i’s cost
in x′, which is κ′i = c(δ′), is less than or equal to i’s cost in x, which is κi = c(δ). Therefore, for
any sampled number si, agent i has a smaller scaled cost κˆ′i in instance x′ than his corresponding
scaled cost κˆi in instance x, which in turn, implies a greater probability that i is designated as the
loser. Moreover, if in instance x′, agent i is allocated a facility at x′i, he incurs a positive cost, since x′i
is different from his true location xi. Thus, putting everything together, we obtain that agent i strictly
prefers x to x′: (
1− qi(x′)
)
c(|x′i − xi|) + qi(x′)c(δ) > qi(x′)c(δ) ≥ qi(x)c(δ)
Case where x′i ∈ (xi−δ, xi+δ) and δ′ > δ. The probability qi(x′) is now greater than the probability
qi(x). However, if agent i is allocated a facility at x′i, in instance x′, he incurs an additional cost of
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c(|x′i−xi|) ≥ c(δ′− δ), due to the distance of x′i to i’s true location xi. Thus, we obtain the following
lower bound on the expected cost of agent i in instance x′:(
1− qi(x′)
)
c(|x′i − xi|) + qi(x′)c(δ) ≥
(
1− qi(x′)
)
(c(δ′)− c(δ)) + qi(x′)c(δ) ,
where the inequality follows from c(δ′) ≤ c(δ) + c(δ′ − δ), which in turn, follows from the concavity
of c. Hence, to conclude that agent i strictly prefers x to x′, we need to show that:(
1− qi(x′)
)
(c(δ′)− c(δ)) + qi(x′)c(δ) > qi(x)c(δ) (1)
To this end, for each even numbered agent j, we let κj and κ′j denote the cost of j computed by
the mechanism for the instances x and x′, respectively. By the definition of the mechanism, we have
that κj = κ′j , for any agent j ∈ E \ {i}, and that κi = c(δ) and κ′i = c(δ′). Hence, the probability
qi(x
′) can be calculated as follows:
qi(x
′) = κ′i
∫ 1/κ′i
0
∏
j∈E\{i}
min{1, κjt}dt (2)
To prove (1), we show that i’ expected cost is increasing with κ′i. To prove this, we show that the
partial derivative of i’s cost with respect to κ′i is positive. Formally, we show that:
∂
∂κ′i
[
(
1− qi(x′)
)
(κ′i − κi) + qi(x′)κi] > 0 (3)
We first substitute qi(x′), with the use of (2), and the left-hand-side of (3) becomes:
∂
∂κ′i



1− κ′i
1/κ′i∫
0
∏
j∈E\{i}
min{1, κjt}dt

 (κ′i − κi) + κi

κ′i
1/κ′i∫
0
∏
j∈E\{i}
min{1, κj t}dt




Next, we calculate the partial derivative with respect to κ′i, and the quantity above becomes:
1−
∏
j∈E\{i}
min
{
1,
κj
κ′i
}
+
2(κ′i − κi)
κ′i

 ∏
j∈E\{i}
min
{
1,
κj
κ′i
}
− κ′i
1/κ′i∫
0
∏
j∈E\{i}
min{1, κj t}dt


Using that
∏
j∈E\{i}min{1, κjt} ≤
∏
j∈E\{i}min{1, κj/κ′i}, which holds for all t ∈ [0, 1/κ′i], and
with strict inequality for t < 1/κ′i, we obtain that the quantity above is greater than:
1−
∏
j∈E\{i}
min
{
1,
κj
κ′i
}
+
2(κ′i − κi)
κ′i

 ∏
j∈E\{i}
min
{
1,
κj
κ′i
}
− κ′i
∏
j∈E\{i}
min
{
1,
κj
κ′i
} 1/κ′i∫
0
1dt


Simplifying the quantity above and returning back to (3), we conclude that:
∂
∂κ′i
[
(
1− qi(x′)
)
(κ′i − κi) + qi(x′)κi] > 1−
∏
j∈E\{i}
min{1, κj/κ′i} ≥ 0
Therefore, the expected cost of agent i is increasing with κ′i. Hence, we obtain that(
1− qi(x′)
)
(κ′i − κi) + qi(x′)κi > qi(x)κi ,
which is identical to (1). This proves that in the third case, agent i strictly prefers x to x′, and con-
cludes the proof of the lemma. ⊓⊔
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6.2 Strong Group Strategyproofness
Proving that PICK THE LOSER is strong group strategyproof requires some additional arguments and
case analysis, where we use that the mechanism is strategyproof (Lemma 6.1).
Throughout this section, we consider an instance x with n distinct locations, where the agents
are numbered as they appear on the line, from left to right. Hence, we have that xi < xi+1, for
all i = 1, . . . , n − 1. We prove that there is no coalition of agents that can benefit by misreporting
their location. For sake of contradiction, let us assume that such a coalition exists. In particular, we
let S be such coalition of minimum size, and let x′ = (x′S ,x−S) be the new instance, where the
agents in S misreport their location. By the definition of strong group strategyproofness, for all i ∈ S,
cost(xi,PtL(x
′, c)) ≤ cost(xi,PtL(x, c)), and the inequality is strict for at least one agent in S.
We observe that for every odd numbered agent i, xi ∈ x′. Otherwise, agent iwould incur a positive
cost in x′, and would prefer x to x′. Since PICK THE LOSER is anonymous, i.e., does not take the
agent identities into account, we can assume wlog. that x′i = xi, which implies that the deviating
coalition S doesn’t contain any odd numbered agents.
Furthermore, we observe that for every even numbered agent i, there is a location in x′ lying in
the interval (xi−1, xi+1), where xn+1 is defined to be ∞. Otherwise agent i would incur an expected
cost of cost(xi,PtL(x′, c)) ≥ min{c(xi − xi−1), c(xi+1 − xi)}, which is greater than his expected
cost for instance x, where xi is allocated a facility with positive probability. Again, since PICK THE
LOSER is anonymous, we can assume wlog. that x′i ∈ (xi−1, xi+1), which implies that the relative
order of the agents in x′ is the same as in x.
Let us now consider an agent i ∈ S, and let κi and κ′i denote the cost of i computed by the
mechanism for the instances x and x′, respectively. Next, we exclude the possibility that κ′i > κi.
Specifically, we show that if κ′i > κi, the instance x′′ = (x′−i, xi) is strictly preferable to x′ for
all agents in S. That holds because, in x′′, agent i has cost κi < κ′i, and therefore, the probability
that he is designated as the loser in x′′ is greater than the corresponding probability in x′. Hence,
for every agent j ∈ E \ {i}, the probability that agent j is designated as the loser in x′′ is less than
the corresponding probability in x′, which implies that agent j strictly prefers the instance x′′ to the
instance x′. Also by Lemma 6.1, PICK THE LOSER is strategyproof, and thus, agent i strictly prefers
the instance x′′ to the instance x′. However, since the number of agents misreporting their locations
in x′′ is one less than the corresponding number in x′, this contradicts the hypothesis that S is the
smallest coalition of agents that can benefit from misreporting their location.
So, let us now assume that κ′i < κi, for all agents i ∈ S, and let ρ = min{κi/κ′i} > 1. We consider
an instance x′′ where the cost κ′′i computed by the mechanism for all agents i ∈ S is equal to ρκ′i.
Such an instance x′′ can be obtained if we let all agents i ∈ S report locations closer to their original
location. We next prove that for every agent i ∈ S, the probability qi(x′′) that i is designated as the
loser in x′′ is less than the probability qi(x′) that i is designated as the loser in x′. More precisely:
qi(x
′′) = IPr[κˆ′′i < κˆ
′′
j ,∀j 6∈ S | κˆ′′i < κˆ′′j ,∀j ∈ S \ {i}] · IPr[κˆ′′i < κˆ′′j ,∀j ∈ S \ {i}]
= IPr[ρκˆ′i < κˆ
′
j ,∀j 6∈ S | ρκˆ′i < ρκˆ′j ,∀j ∈ S \ {i}] · IPr[ρκˆ′i < ρκˆ′j ,∀j ∈ S \ {i}]
= IPr[κˆ′i < κˆ
′
j/ρ,∀j 6∈ S | κˆ′i < κˆ′j ,∀j ∈ S \ {i}] · IPr[κˆ′i < κˆ′j ,∀j ∈ S \ {i}]
< IPr[κˆ′i < κˆ
′
j ,∀j 6∈ S | κˆ′i < κˆ′j ,∀j ∈ S \ {i}] · IPr[κˆ′i < κˆ′j ,∀j ∈ S \ {i}]
= qi(x
′)
Since for every agent i ∈ S, (i) the probability that i is designated as the loser is smaller in x′′
than in x, i.e., qi(x′′) < qi(x′), (ii) the reported location of i in x′′ is closer to his true location xi
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than his reported location in x′, i.e., |x′′i − xi| < |x′i − xi|, and (iii) there are no odd numbered agents
in S, all agents i ∈ S strictly prefer x′′ to x′.
Therefore, we can assume that in the instance x′, there is an agent i ∈ S with κ′i = κi. We now
consider the instance x′′ = (x′−i, xi), where the agent i is removed from the deviating coalition S.
We note that for every agent j ∈ S, the probability that agent j is designated as the loser in x′′ is the
same as the corresponding probability in x′, i.e., qj(x′′) = qj(x′). Therefore, the expected cost of
every agent j ∈ S \ {i} in x′′ is the same as his expected cost in x′. Moreover, by Lemma 6.1, PICK
THE LOSER is strategyproof, and thus, the expected cost of agent i in x′′ is less than his expected cost
in x′. Therefore, if the agents in the coalition S can benefit by misreporting their locations, the same
holds for the S \{i}. However, this contradicts the hypothesis that S is the smallest coalition of agents
that can benefit from misreporting their location. Hence, we have shown that such a coalition S does
not exist, and thus, the mechanism PICK THE LOSER is strongly group strategyproof.
6.3 Approximation Ratio
Lemma 6.2. For all concave cost functions, PICK THE LOSER achieves an approximation ratio of at
most 2 for the objective of SOCIAL COST, and an approximation ratio of at most 4 for the objective
of MAX COST.
Proof. Let (x, c) be any instance with concave c, and let q be an agent with κq = mini{κi}. Then,
SC∗(x, c) = κq , while the SOCIAL COST of the mechanism is equal to:
∑
i
κi
∫ 1/κi
0
κi
∏
j∈E\{i}
min{1, κjt}dt ≤ κq +
∑
i 6=q
κi
∫ 1/κi
0
κi
∏
j∈E\{i}
min{1, κjt}dt
= κq +
∑
i 6=q
κi
∫ 1/κi
0
κiκqt
∏
j∈E\{i,q}
min{1, κj t}dt
≤ κq +
∑
i 6=q
κi
∫ 1/κi
0
κq
∏
j∈E\{i,q}
min{1, κjt}dt
≤ κq + κq
∑
i 6=q
∫ 1/κi
0
κi
∏
j∈E\{i,q}
min{1, κjt}dt
= κq + κq
∑
i 6=q
IPr[κˆi < κˆj ,∀j 6∈ {i, q}]dt
= κq + κq · 1 = 2κq
Moreover, since c is concave, MC∗(x, c) ≥ κq/2 = 2κq/4 ≥ MC(PtL(x, c))/4. ⊓⊔
7 Open Problems
There are a few interesting open problems arising from our work. First, since EQUAL COST crucially
depends on the linear structure of the instances, it would be interesting to have a mechanism that can
be applied to more general metric spaces, and retains the nice properties of EQUAL COST. Another
intriguing open problem has to do with the approximability of SOCIAL COST by randomized strate-
gyproof mechanisms. Despite the considerable interest in the problem, we do not know whether there
exists a randomized mechanism for k-Facility Location that achieves an approximation ratio of o(n)
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for all k ≥ 3. Another, more general, direction for further research may concern the role of the cost
function c, which we assume here to be the same for all players. It would be interesting to investigate
the approximability of k-Facility Location on the line if each agent i may have a different concave
cost function ci(d). A good starting point in this direction may be a simple setting where each agent i
is associated with a tuple (xi, ri), with possibly both xi and ri being private information, and there is
some fixed small cost incurred by agent i, if there is a facility within a distance of ri to xi, and some
fixed large cost incurred by agent i, otherwise.
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